

Are Refugees Integrating Successfully in Wichita, Kansas?

by Claire Branstetter

Introduction

There was rapid Spanish flying back and forth, spicy posole, and lively Latin music. I was in Wichita, Kansas, but I felt transported to another place at my friend Carolina's baby shower. How did a very white, native English-speaker end up at the baby shower of an El Salvadorian asylum-seeker? We actually met at a garage sale. Carolina and her husband were looking for bargain furniture, and I happen to be bilingual enough to coordinate moving a bookshelf. We ended up staying in touch; I would meet up with her and chat in Spanish. Slowly I began to piece together parts of her story, which included fleeing from gang violence in El Salvador after a gun ended up against her husband's head, praying that both her and her husband's asylum applications would be approved by the courts, doctor's appointments to check on her unborn child, and hoping the rest of the family would be able to follow her someday. I watched her struggle with things I took for granted, like feeling safe outside. After seeing the challenges Carolina faced in my community, I wanted to know more about the situation of migrants in Wichita. In recent years, Wichita, Kansas has become a hub for refugee resettlement, but little research has been conducted here. I hope to fill the knowledge gap of integration at the grassroots level, gather information which can lead to better-informed policy, and correct misunderstandings about refugees in our communities.

Refugees are integrating, but with difficulty. In Wichita, the surrounding community and the federal government have provided the most support for integration. However, some leaders at the state and local level resist refugees. To come to such a conclusion, I begin with a brief overview of community-level integration literature to outline the legal parameters and social obstacles affecting migrants. I then employ social capital theory to explain refugee integration in terms of the relationships developed with other migrants, native-born citizens, and local institutions.

Since the investigation relies heavily on qualitative factors, I utilize the "Indicators of Integration" framework to operationalize integration into nine essential domains and identify potential types of data to proxy success in each area. I then evaluate the findings of refugee integration in Wichita, Kansas and discuss the implications of the findings in light of the current political climate.

Background

Understanding Integration

Migrants fleeing persecution and violence enter the United States either as refugees or asylum-seekers.¹ The political status matters because policies and service agencies prioritize refugee status over asylum-seekers. Unlike a refugee, asylum-seekers must win a court case in order to stay in the U.S., which often means government policy is more reluctant to grant asylum-seekers entitlements to welfare services or a choice in resettlement location (Spicer, 2008). Furthermore, policy and services focus predominately on refugees, leading to the political and social exclusion of people seeking asylum in comparison to individuals with refugee status (Daley, 2009). Asylum-seekers tend to come from El Salvador, Guatemala, China, and Egypt, while refugees are more likely to come from Iraq, Burma, Somalia, or Bhutan (Mossad, 2016; Mossad, 2015; Young, 2001; Nawyn, 2012). Asylum-seekers in Wichita likely face more social exclusion compared to refugees. While Asylum-seekers and asylees are a part of the migrant community fleeing from violence, relatively little data exists to analyze

¹ To become a refugee, a migrant must apply while outside of the U.S., either through the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (Mossaad, 2014). Asylum-seekers forgo the UNHCR or USRAP process and come directly to the United States; the asylum applicants may remain in the country until the court grants asylum status or decides to deport the individual (USCIS).

asylee integration; therefore, this investigation will focus on refugees. Conclusions drawn about refugee integration do not necessarily extend to asylum-seekers.

Without much of a social safety net, difficulties such as health problems, limited employment prospects, and language barriers can quickly compound and prevent refugee integration. The failure to integrate either results in isolation and exclusion within the new host society or, in more extreme cases, deportation. Social exclusion is the interaction of factors including poverty, social disadvantage, poor health, cultural marginalization, and limited spatial mobility (Spicer, 2008). The case of one Tanzanian immigrant in Wichita provides a relevant example: Although he was lucky to find a low-paying assembly plant job to help pay the bills and tuition, a downturn in the city's aircraft industry left him unemployed and without social support (Dosi, 2007). The young migrant lost his apartment, developed an abdominal disorder, dropped out of school, and consequently fell out of status with the Immigration Department, resulting in deportation (Dosi, 2007). If refugees are struggling to integrate in Wichita, signs would include high levels of unemployment, incarceration, and deportation. On the other hand, signs of integration would include the availability of employment assistance, access to health care, and the ability to access social safety nets like TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families).

The Role of Social Capital on Integration

Social capital explains the effects of accumulated relationships and networks on society and individuals. The idea that social networks have value is not new or particularly surprising; people generally acknowledge the need for one another. However, in the seminal work "Bowling Alone," Robert Putnam (2000) shocked sociologist peers and citizens across the U.S. with years of research showing the level of connectedness within a society to have positive effects in areas such as health, politics, the economy, and crime. Social capital theory makes intuitive sense, because without access to others, even the latest equipment and most innovative people are unproductive; ultimately, relationships create the pathways necessary for the exchange of knowledge

and resources between individuals (Woolcock, 1998; Putnam, 2000). Communities possessing high stocks of social capital tend to find and keep good jobs, initiate projects serving public interests, enforce contractual agreements, use existing resources more efficiently, and resolve disputes more amicably in comparison to communities with low stocks of social capital (Woolcock, 1998). Social capital theory elucidates how the limited social networks of refugees encumber integration. When cultural and language barriers obstruct the development of connections in the host society, acquiring resources like employment, housing, and transportation becomes much more difficult. The more relationships refugees form with native citizens, community organizations, and corporations in the Wichita area, the more likely integration is successful.

Relationships fall into certain categories, classified by the nature of the relationship and the type of benefit produced. For social capital to lead to the greatest societal benefit, relationships must develop in all three of the following categories: bonding social capital, bridging social capital, and linking social capital. The first category, bonding social capital, accrues from networks people frequently access, the tight-knit communities formed around shared experiences or values (Putnam, 2000). Bonded groups feel like one unit and share solidarity, acting as a sort of societal "glue" that encourages norms of specific reciprocity and creates a sense of belonging (Putnam, 2000). Bonding commonly happens between individuals sharing an ethnicity, religion, or family ties and often serves as the primary source of emotional and psychological support (Ager & Strang, 2004; Putnam, 2000). Refugees and asylum-seekers access bonding social capital by settling in ethnic enclaves and by relying on close friends and family to cope with culture shock and trauma. Bonding social capital within the migrant community of Wichita has the potential to both integrate and isolate refugees.

Bridging social capital can counteract the potentially isolating effects of bonding social capital. Furthermore, communities high in bridging social capital as well as bonding social capital have advantages over communities relying mainly on bonding. Bridging social capital originates in networks of less frequent interaction that lack

a permanent bonding denominator and helps conceptualize the benefits of networking across social cleavages (Putnam, 2002). Examples include connections between communities with different ethnic, national, or religious identities (Ager & Strang, 2004). The main advantages of bridging social capital are the connections to opportunities, assets, and information not possessed by individuals in the bonded group and general reciprocity, which helps individuals to feel safe and be mindful of others (Putnam, 2002). In the study of refugees, the concept of bridging applies to relations between migrants and native citizens as well as between ethnic groups. In order to integrate into society, refugees and asylum-seekers must be able to develop relationships with members of the community outside of an ethnic enclave.

The final aspect of social capital theory, linking social capital, seeks to address relationships not only with people, but with institutions or organizations. Knowing how to “work the system” is a sign of extremely high linking social capital. Links are connections facilitating access to services and citizen involvement and may include the government, health care providers, and social service agencies (Ager & Strang, 2004). There are considerable geographical variations in the inclusiveness of health care and social care services to asylum-seekers and refugees (Spicer, 2008). Being a refugee means interacting with the local government and resettlement agencies, and therefore, linking with organizations like the Episcopal Migration Ministries (EWARM) and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) can determine integration success as much as bonding or bridging social capital. Integration is taking place if evidence shows refugees have links with local government, health care providers, and local community organizations.

Methods and Data

To evaluate the integration of refugees and related populations, a model needs to be simple and consistent, but also comprehensive and flexible enough to adapt to a local context. Through their research on refugee and asylee integration in Great Britain, Alastair Ager and Alison Strang (2004) developed a workable “Indicators of Integration Framework” for the British government (Appendix

A). The conceptual framework operationalizes integration by identifying ten essential domains and suggesting several techniques to measure each indicator on both a policy and practical level. For example, policy makers can look for evidence of social bonds in the “number of registered refugee community organisations and the years in operation” (Ager & Strang, 2004). The publicly available data for Wichita allows for an analysis of integration in the domains of Rights and Citizenship, Safety and Stability, Social Bonds, and Social Links.

I analyzed the qualitative data gathered from local sources and the quantitative data from the federal government by placing the information into the categories specified by the indicators of integration framework. Sometimes the data I found matched the author’s suggested data, but I often had to choose the best domain for the data I had. Based on the categories with the most evidence, I decided to focus on the domains of “Health,” “Social Links,” “Safety and Stability,” and “Rights and Citizenship” to analyze integration. However, I also found some data in the categories of “Education,” “Social Bridges,” and “Social Bonds.” Within each domain, I noted the data supporting successful integration and the data indicating otherwise. Based on which seemed stronger, I classified each domain as either “showing integration” or “not showing integration” in Wichita. “Successful integration” for refugees in Wichita meant a majority of the domains had evidence of integration.

Findings

I estimate around 2,000 refugees live in Wichita, Kansas. Well-defined statistics on the population size are either confidential or not tracked at the city level. Combine the temporary nature of “refugee” political status with freedom of mobility, and the refugee population within a city is difficult to track. Nevertheless, between 2012 and 2016, the consolidated placement plan of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration approved Wichita to accept up to 1,220 refugees (Figure 1 and Table 1). However, according to one local news source, in 2014, over 1,200 refugees already lived in Wichita (Shaar, 2014). Therefore, since the processing center approved almost 700 more refugees in 2015 and 2016, the number should at

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


Figure 1. Refugees in Wichita by Approved Resettlement Capacity, 2012-2016.

Year	New Refugees
2016	440
2015	230
2014	215
2013	175
2012	160
Total	1,220

Figure 1 and Table 1. Refugees in Wichita by Approved Resettlement Capacity. Data adapted from the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration; Office of Admissions, Refugee Processing Center, Consolidated Placement Plan (2016).

least be as high as 1,920 (Refugee Processing Center, 2016).² Given the possibility of changes in the refugee population that the government or local agencies may not take into account (i.e., refugees migrating to Wichita from other U.S. cities or growing refugee families), I round the number up to 2000. Knowing the approximate size of the population provides a measure to judge the adequacy of government grants

² Including asylum-seekers, the numbers will be larger. Given that the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services received only a slightly smaller number of applications to register for lawful permanent residence (LPR) status from asylum-seekers than refugees, asylum-seekers likely have a smaller but comparable population size (USCIS, 2016). See Appendix E and F for asylum applications compared to that of refugees from 2010-2012.

for health and education. However, the available data is not clear whether the numbers include only migrants who recently held political refugee status or count residents with refugee backgrounds, such as migrants from Vietnam during the 70s and 80s. The city of Wichita should attempt to keep more exact figures, unless protecting refugees requires city-level data remain confidential.

Evidence of Successful Integration

Refugees have links with Wichita community organizations beyond just refugee resettlement agencies. While the two resettlement agencies—the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and the Episcopal Migration Ministries (EMM)—provide employment services and language training, refugee populations will have an easier time integrating with backing from the surrounding community as well. Habitat for Humanity recently built a house for Jolie Uwizeye, a single mother of two, who finally resettled in Wichita after fleeing from the Congo (Arnold, 2016). Wichita Refugees Connect, affiliated with Wichita’s Cross Cultural Institute, hosted the organization’s second annual Thanksgiving dinner for refugees, and over 70 individuals attended (Puntel-Sessions, 2016). Students from Wichita State University began an organization two years ago called “Reaching out 2 Refugees,” which addresses material needs such as coats and furniture (Shaar, 2014). The existence of multiple community connections suggests refugee populations are building social capital within the Wichita area. Relationships between refugees and community organizations is an example of linking social capital, while relationships between refugees and individual community members exemplifies bridging social capital. Refugees are building both simultaneously.

Existing bonding, bridging, and linking social capital among the African migrant community of Wichita may facilitate the integration of African migrants in comparison to other refugee groups. Newcomers can connect with longstanding African community organizations, easily fulfilling the social connections tier of the integration framework. Wichita boasts community organizations such as the Wichita African Union and two Tanzanian community organizations, Tawichita and Zanama (Tawichita, 2016; Dosi, 2007). The most recent posts on Tawichita’s blog include updates on changes

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for asylum-based work cards and a federal court ruling on immigration law, demonstrating how social capital helps refugees quickly access pertinent information (Tawichita, 2016). The existence of a strong African civil society in Wichita may explain why Swahili-speakers have been more successful at using public transportation than speakers of Asian and Indo-European languages, despite having a smaller population size (Table 2); Swahili is the second most encountered language after Spanish on the Wichita transit system (City of Wichita, 2016).³ Most likely, Swahili-speaking refugees become comfortable using the Wichita transit system because other conationals already know how to use the buses, demonstrating how bonding social capital transfers information. Although not fitting into one of the identified integration domains, the use of public transit shows successful integration because the refugees do not require any outside assistance to utilize the resource.

4.3	Speak Spanish
1.4	Speak Vietnamese
0.2	Speak Chinese
2.1	Speak another Asian Language
0.3	Speak an Indo-European Language
0.2	Other

*Percentage speaking English less than “very well”

The linking social capital of refugees in Wichita increases access to medical and health support. The local resettlement agencies are not under pressure to provide the entirety of the assistance, but partner with the community and receive funding from the federal government.⁴ International Rescue Committee staff and community partners ensure

³Swahili is the official language of Tanzania, and countries such as The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Burundi, and Somalia also speak Swahili. See Appendix B and C for refugee numbers by country of origin.

⁴The federal government channels the funds through the Kansas legislature, which distributes the money to state entities such as the Department for Children and Families (Appendix D). The department will then use the funds to serve refugees.

newly arrived refugees have access to nutritious food and health care as well as provide referrals to appropriate care providers (IRC, 2016). However, the first time a refugee in Wichita encounters the Kansas health system is often through the Refugee Health Clinic of the Sedgwick County Health Department. At this clinic, patients often receive a complete health assessment, treatments or referrals if necessary, and advice for finding a primary physician and a dental provider (SCHD, 2013; SCHD, 2014). The federal government supports health services to Kansas refugees through the Office of Refugee Resettlement. The department gave both a mandatory grant to the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services for “Cash and Medical Assistance” totaling \$1,163,729 between fiscal years 2009/10 and 2013/14 as well as a discretionary grant to the Kansas Department of Health and Environment for “Preventative Health,” totaling \$297,252 between 2011/12 and 2013/14 (Office of Refugee Resettlement, 2015). Health funding improves chances of integration for refugees in Wichita. However, the existence of health care does not guarantee the sufficiency of the support.

The state government has begun to provide support to catch up with the growing number of refugees. The assistance mainly addresses the identified integration areas of education and health. For instance, Wichita schools received a grant through the Kansas Extraordinary Needs Fund for nearly \$687,000 during the 2016-2017 school year to provide instructional and emotional support for the 230 refugee students as well as trauma training for paraprofessionals; the amount nearly doubled the \$366,000 received in assistance last year (Arnold, 2016). As of 2015, refugees have been able to access Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), although receiving TANF disqualifies the




Figure 2. State of Kansas Office of Refugee Resettlement Funded Programs. Data adapted from the Office of Refugee Resettlement (2016).

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Table 3

Humanitarian-Based LPR Applications

	Receipts	Approvals	Denials	Pending
As of June 2016	30	33	0	112
2015	48	109	2	204
2014	65	19	0	214
2013	25	20	0	85
2012	36	37	5	15
2011	21	39	10	17
2010	42	43	3	17

Note: Data for I-485 Applications to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status in Wichita, Kansas adapted from USCIS (2016).

individuals from accessing services from the refugee resettlement agencies (Kansas Legislature, 2015). The Wichita Transit provides translation services and has developed a relationship with the International Rescue Committee (City of Wichita, 2016). However, the grant was only for one school year, Kansas is experiencing a budget crisis, and many legislators have expressed anti-refugee sentiment.

Evidence Against Successful Integration

Too few refugees are applying for lawful permanent resident (LPR) status. The numbers do not match the arrivals from the previous year or even follow an increasing trend corresponding to the growing number of refugees. Legally, refugees must apply for permanent resident status one year after arriving in the United States (Mossaad, 2016). In 2013, the State Department approved resettling up to 175 refugees in Wichita; therefore, in 2014, around 175 refugees should have applied for LPR Status (Refugee Processing Center, 2016).⁵ However, in 2014, the USCIS received only 65 applications (Table 3), including applications from asylum-seekers (USCIS, 2016).⁶ The number of applications are low either because the government lacks the capacity to process more applications or because refugees are

⁵ The capacity numbers do not necessarily mean 175 refugees resettled in Wichita in 2014. However, the same year the SCHD Refugee Health Clinic provided exams to 144 newly arrived refugees (SCHD, 2013). Therefore, at least 144 new refugees should have applied.

⁶ The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also tracks how many refugees and asylees receive permanent resident status. The numbers differ slightly from USCIS, but are still far too low. See Appendix F and G for a comparison with the DHS numbers.

not applying for LPR status. Either way, the data does not support integration in the “Rights and Citizenship” category because without first gaining the LPR status, refugees cannot become citizens.

Refugees in Wichita do not show integration in the “Safety and Stability” domain. Even if a refugee becomes an LPR, the individual does not possess the right to stay in the United States. In addition to legal instability, refugees also live in high crime areas. Deporting refugees violates international law unless the refugee commits a “capital crime.” However, the U.S. circumvents the law by requiring refugees to apply to become LPRs, a deportable migrant status (Leitner Center, 2010). In 1996, Congress expanded the categories of deportation to include minor crimes and non-violent offenses (Leitner Center, 2010). The resettlement agencies in Wichita are in high crime areas (Figure 3 and 4). Living near crime is unsafe and more likely to result in deportation if an individual becomes involved in a minor crime or is mistakenly associated with a crime. Given President Trump’s promise to increase deportations, the problem is even more pressing. Future research should further investigate whether refugees feel safe applying for LPR status and living in Wichita neighborhoods.

At the state level of Kansas politics, real anti-refugee sentiment exists, especially against Muslim refugees. Some of the most vocal opponents have ties to Wichita, complicating refugee integration in the “Rights and Citizenship” and “Safety and Stability” categories. Governor Sam Brownback withdrew Kansas from the Federal Resettlement




Figure 3. Locations of Resettlement Agencies in Relation to Aggravated Assaults. Reprinted from *Wichita City Agenda*.

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


Figure 4. Locations of Resettlement Agencies in Relation to Burglary Incidents. Reprinted from *Wichita City Agenda*.

program, which jeopardized around \$2.2 million in refugee assistance from the federal government funneled through state programs (Lowry, 2016b) (Figure 2). The Federal government and the Kansas refugee resettlement agencies continued to resettle migrants from Muslim countries anyway, which prompted House Bill No. 2661, which states, “No refugee resettlement agency... shall make any recommendation to the federal government that refugees relocating from affected nations⁷ be placed in Kansas (Refugee Placement Act, 2016). Of the twenty-two cosponsors, four are from Wichita: Peter DeGraaf, Blake Carpenter, Mike Khars, and Joseph Scapa (Kansas Legislature, 2016). Cutting federally funded programs would have been devastating to the integration of recently arrived refugees. Additionally, the political and legal systems of Kansas cannot ensure refugees’ safety if important officials see refugees as a danger to the community.

Joseph Scapa, one of the cosponsors of the Refugee Placement Act and the Refugee Absorptive Capacity Act, attempted to use fear of refugees as a political device for his reelection to the House of Representatives. The propaganda may have hurt the ability of refugees to create social bridges

⁷ “‘Affected nation’ means any nation that is under the governmental control, whether wholly or partially, of the Islamic state of Iraq and al-Sham, also known as the Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant, or any other Muslim organization whose primary purpose is substantially similar to the aforementioned organization” (House of Representatives, 2016).




Figure 5. GOP Mailer, House 88th District, Wichita. Reprinted from *GOP mailers: Watch for new ISIS ‘neighbors’ in Kansas*, by Bryan Lowry, October 28, 2016.

with individuals in Wichita, affecting chances of integration. The Republican party sent mailers out to Wichita’s House District 88 (Figure 5) in support of Scapa’s campaign with a promise to train Kansas law enforcement officers to “recognize and deal with foreign and domestic threats to our state, from those who support ideologies conflicting with the U.S. Constitution and Kansas values” (Lowry, 2016a). Ironically, the only example of aspiring terrorists in Kansas are native-born white nationalists attempting to bomb Somali immigrants in Garden City (Oberholtz, 2016). Moussa Elbayoumy, the chairman of the Kansas chapter of the Council on American Islamic Relations, criticized the misrepresentation of Muslims as terrorists, arguing the Muslim community was “mostly well integrated into society and happy,” aside from a few “scattered cases of discrimination” (Hayden, 2016). Integration is a preferable solution to policing refugees. However, local government officials’ influence on community attitudes can prevent integration from happening, paradoxically triggering the realization of unfounded fears.

Anti-refugee sentiment is not limited to state-level politics. High ranking local officials on the Sedgwick County Commission share the distrust. A general misunderstanding about Muslim refugees and the screening process is evident among local officials and seems to fuel the push for anti-refugee legislation at the state level. Chairman of the Sedgwick County Commission Richard Ranzau sent letters to the U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement and the Kansas Department of Children and Families asking to “Halt all refugee resettlement operations in the state until a state-wide policy has been developed

and implemented providing local jurisdictions the opportunity to opt-out of refugee resettlements” (Cobb, 2016). The Chairman’s action stems from concern about social service funding and safety, as he has stated, “I do not believe local communities should carry the financial burden and the increased safety risk.” A majority of commissioners agreed (Cobb, 2016). However, funding comes from the federal government, not the community, and refugees undergo vetting from the United Nations, the State Department, and the Department of Justice (Anderson, 2015). If Wichita were to “opt out” of resettlement, refugees would lose access to the social capital from established migrants and experienced service providers. Additionally, if political officials see refugees as a threat, the reaction is to limit refugees’ rights.

Discussion and Conclusion

Resettlement agencies should consider making local websites more transparent by adding statistical information and sharing success stories of willing refugees. Some clarity may mitigate the misunderstanding and fear of native citizens and policy makers. Local officials are attempting to obtain information from resettlement agencies previously only available to the Department of State (Cobb, 2015). In 2016, a bill died in the legislature requiring resettlement agencies to submit copies of federal reports to state officials, local governments, and local law enforcement, in addition to detailed information of refugees by numbers, demographics, and zip codes as well as criminal records, incidents of abuse, and documentation of all public or private cash assistance (Refugee Absorptive Capacity Act, 2016)⁸. Detailed statistical records in the hands of officials known to have anti-migrant sentiments would likely have negative effects on refugee populations; however, the lack of published data also means that potential allies, such as researchers, community members, ministries, and non-profit organizations, often cannot access information. In the current political climate, resettlement agencies must be

more than quiet operations working with federal and international institutions, but serve refugees by advocating locally, loudly, and transparently.

With the current political climate and low LPR application rates, claiming refugees are successful in the “Rights and Citizenship” category may seem like a stretch. Some may argue evidence in the foundational category must negate successful integration. Governor Brownback tried to stop state funding, prevent resettlement agencies from accepting more refugees, and give himself the power to define Wichita’s carrying capacity (Lowry, 2016; Refugee Absorptive Capacity Act, 2016; Refugee Placement Act, 2016). Joseph Scapa promoted the bills in the legislature and sent out mailers promoting fear and distrust of refugees in native born U.S. citizens (Refugee Absorptive Capacity Act, 2016; Refugee Placement Act, 2016; ABC News, 2016). Legal permanent resident applications do not match refugee numbers, and the government is not explicitly tracking refugee citizenship applications (USCIS, 2016; DHS, 2016). Nevertheless, the governor was not successful at stopping refugees from entering Kansas, and the bills did not become laws. Scapa’s propaganda did not get him reelected, and there was enough support in the state government to provide grants to schools and ensure refugees have access to TANF. While the Trump administration may embolden certain political officials to push harder for anti-refugee legislation, the support remaining in the legislature and the community can go far to help refugees overcome the political difficulties.

Despite weak integration in the “Rights and Citizenship” and “Safety and Stability” categories, refugees are integrating into the community. The evidence of initial assistance in the spheres of health, education, and social links shows that Wichita gives refugees an initial boost. Once confident in their abilities to support themselves, most refugees move away from public assistance (Balgopal, 2000, as cited in Segal, 2005); therefore, the continued support of the state is not a necessity for established refugees, only new refugees. Enough state support currently exists to ensure a successful start, as refugees can access 8 months of service from the resettlement agencies (IRC, 2016), health examinations and referrals (SCHD, 2012; SCHD, 2013), and an education system with increased experience and

⁸ Recipients include committees on federal and state affairs and the judiciary committee of both the house and the senate, the adjutant general (Maj. Gen. Lee Tafanelli), and the attorney general (Kris Kobach).

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training in working with refugees (Arnold, 2016). The largest unmet concern is refugee safety and stability. However, as refugees move away from social services, they may also move away from the resettlement agencies to safer locations.

Refugees are integrating successfully in more domains than not. The strongest areas are “Health,” “Education,” “Social Bonds,” and “Social Links.” The weakest areas are “Safety and Stability,” and “Rights and Citizenship.” Refugees and resettlement agencies cannot rely on the state to meet the integration requirements of refugees. However, the increasing social capital for refugees in Wichita decreases the need to rely on the state for successful integration. Therefore, the citizens of Wichita have a key role in making the city a welcoming and helpful place.

Appendix

Indicators of Integration Framework



Appendix A. Indicators of Integration Framework, reprinted from *Indicators of Integration*, by Alastair Ager and Allison Strang, 2004, Crown copyright 2004.

Kansas Refugee and Asylee Arrivals

Birthplace	2012	2013	2014	2015	Total
AFGHANISTAN	0	0	0	18	18
BHUTAN	111	58	36	42	247
BURMA	180	230	189	352	951
BURUNDI	7	0	1	4	12
CAMBODIA	0	0	0	0	0
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	0	0	0	1	1
CHAD	0	0	0	0	0
CHINA	1	0	0	0	1
COLOMBIA	0	0	0	0	0
CONGO	0	0	0	0	0
CUBA	0	26	28	11	65
DEM. REP. CONGO	0	29	33	145	207
DJIBOUTI	0	0	0	0	0
ECUADOR	0	0	0	0	0
EGYPT	0	0	0	0	0
ERITREA	13	13	30	47	103
ETHIOPIA	3	7	5	4	19
INDONESIA	0	0	1	0	1
IRAN	4	5	7	0	16
IRAQ	23	43	68	68	202
JORDAN	2	0	1	0	3
LIBERIA	0	2	0	0	2
MOROCCO	1	0	0	0	1
NEPAL	1	0	2	1	4
PAKISTAN	0	2	6	0	8
RUSSIA	0	0	0	1	1
SOMALIA	16	36	70	60	182
SUDAN	21	23	13	8	65
SYRIA	0	0	0	8	8
THAILAND	1	0	0	0	1
Total Arrivals by Year	384	474	490	770	2118

Appendix B. Kansas Refugee and Asylee Arrivals. Note: Data for Refugee Arrivals by Country of Origin in Kansas, adapted from the Office of Refugee Resettlement (2016).

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Migrants Naturalized in Wichita by Year

Birthplace	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
Bangladesh	11	8	19	17	55
Brazil	0	0	6	0	6
Cambodia	0	13	6	8	27
Canada	0	10	7	0	17
China	13	14	16	9	52
Colombia	10	0	0	0	10
El Salvador	16	9	15	20	60
Germany	6	0	0	0	6
India	12	19	14	23	68
Iran	0	8	0	6	14
Jordan	0	8	0	0	8
Kenya	19	20	17	23	79
Korea, South	7	8	0	0	15
Laos	16	9	16	36	77
Lebanon	11	10	6	7	34
Malaysia	0	0	6	0	6
Mexico	118	147	139	132	536
Morocco	6	0	0	7	13
Nepal	0	0	0	7	7
Nigeria	14	14	7	0	35
Pakistan	9	8	26	16	59
Peru	0	0	0	9	9
Philippines	28	26	28	23	105
Russia	0	0	6	0	6
Rwanda	7	0	0	0	7
Sri Lanka	7	0	0	0	7
Syria	0	0	0	9	9
Tanzania	0	0	8	7	15
Thailand	8	10	8	7	33
UK	9	14	6	11	40
Venezuela	0	9	0	0	9
Vietnam	97	123	149	115	484
Other	124	153	122	139	538

Appendix C. Migrants Naturalized in Wichita by Year. Note: Data for Refugee Arrivals by Country of Origin in Kansas, adapted from the Office of Refugee Resettlement (2016).

State of Kansas ORR Funded Programs

Fiscal Year	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14
Discretionary Grants to Local Agencies					
IRC Wichita	-	-	\$88,000	\$88,000	\$129,800
Episcopal Wichita Area Refugee Ministries	-	-	-	-	\$55,000
Mandatory and Formula Grants to States					
Refugee Social Services Program	-	-	\$380,561	\$397,892	\$385,276
Cash and Medical Assistance	\$150,000	-	\$645,000	\$575,000	\$835,000
Discretionary Grants to Kansas Department of Health and Environment					
Preventive Health	\$57,200	-	\$100,000	\$100,000	\$97,252
Cuban/ Haitian	\$0	-	\$0	\$0	\$0

Appendix D. State of Kansas ORR Funded Programs. Note: State of Kansas Office of Refugee Resettlement Funded Programs. Data adapted from Office of Refugee Resettlement (2016).

Number of I-485 Applications to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status - Wichita, Kansas

	Asylee				Refugee			
	Receipts	Approvals	Denials	Pending	Receipts	Approvals	Denials	Pending
2010	-	8	-	2	-	7	3	6
2011	-	4	-	4	-	11	4	5
2012	-	7	1	1	10	6	4	6
Total		19	1	7		24	11	17

Appendix E. Number of I-485 Applications to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status - Wichita, Kansas. Note: Data for Refugees and Asylees attaining lawful permanent resident status, 2010-2012, adapted from United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (2016).

Refugees and Asylees Obtaining LPR Status

	Total	Male	Female
2014	77	41	36
2013	49	29	20
2012	49	26	23
2011	30	15	15
2010	33	20	13
2009	41	25	16
2008	44	23	21
2007	41	20	21
2006	44	29	15
2005	52	30	22
2004	27	15	12
2003	25	12	13

Appendix F. Refugees and Asylees Obtaining LPR Status. Note: Data for Refugees and Asylees attaining LPR status, Male and Female, 2003-2014, adapted from the Department of Homeland Security (2016).

Differences between Sources: Obtaining LPR Status

Year	DHS	USCIS
2014	77	19
2013	49	20
2012	49	37
2011	30	39
2010	33	43

Appendix G. Differences between Sources: Obtaining LPR Status. Note: Refugees and Asylees attaining lawful permanent resident status in Wichita, KS, 2010-2014, adapted from the Department of Homeland Security (2016), United States Citizenship and Immigration Department (2016).

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