"Why Can't I Find It?": Mining Transparency in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo

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Abstract: This research focuses on foreign intervention in the mining sectors of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), concentrating on the transparency of agreements and regulation, or lack thereof, which contributes to the sustainability of mining practices and the livelihoods of local citizens. The current state of public information regarding natural resource extraction in both countries creates questions about state motives and investors' incentives, with consequences of inequality, human rights offenses, and underdevelopment. Applying Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems theory, I describe the economic rationale behind global involvement in the region's mining operations and identify potential power imbalances. I use commodity statistics, state documentation, and nongovernmental reports to analyze reporting trends on mining operations. Intergovernmental databases with development statistics also contribute to the research. In this study, I argue foreign intervention in underdeveloped, mineral-rich countries does not have to be a purely exploitative relationship as emphasized by Wallerstein's theory, which can be demonstrated through the implementation of international transparency initiatives. These programs, employed to benefit resource-abundant countries like Zambia and the DRC, can increase corporate and government accountability related to mining activities. Complete reporting on natural resource extraction increases investment values and the development and productivity of the mining industry.

Walking into an American mall on a Saturday afternoon, the typical scene greeting the eye involves busy shoppers interspersed with rows of electronic gadgets, sparkling jewelry, and newfangled appliances. With little thought to sourcing, construction, or ethical concerns, consumers buy into the latest fads and go about business as usual, assuming companies and governments deal with the go-between details honorably. However, the process is more complex. Exposed by the media, depicted in films, and protested by nonprofit organizations, the mining of natural resources used to make cherished products has become somewhat controversial recently, yet little is known about it.

The manufacturing of high-demand commodities uses raw materials extracted from specific resource-abundant areas of the globe. The African region encompassing Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) holds many of the world's most valuable natural resources. As of 2015, the DRC owned approximately 24 trillion dollars worth of mineral assets, primarily composed of gold, copper, diamond, coltan, and cobalt deposits ("DR Congo: UN Advises," 2011). Zambia possesses additional resources, but specializes in copper extraction, holding the world's most productive reserves (Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.). The countries' natural resource abundance entices global investors, leading to potential for successful business partnerships, but also dangers of corrupt, manipulative extraction. Prioritizing capitalist self-interests, multinational corporations (MNCs) risk exploiting these resources.

Demand for raw materials to engineer high-value products motivates international interest in resource-rich countries like Zambia and the DRC. Globalization and technological advances in mining and manufacturing during the early twentieth-century coincided with colonial rule in Africa. Colonial powers extracted raw materials from the continent to fulfill European capitalist motives, while reconstructing the political spheres of African nations. Both countries won independence in the 1960s from European colonizers—Zambia from Britain and the DRC from Belgium—entering a tumultuous period of economic and political adjustment (Sikamo, Mwanza, & Mweemba, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2009). Attempting to regain economic stability and international recognition, Zambian and Congolese governments encouraged multinational mining within national borders (Sikamo, Mwanza, & Mweemba, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2009). Thus began a new boom of foreign investment and involvement in the mining industry, with indirect international infiltration into the economic and political structures of each country. In recent years, as these trends continue, so does resource extraction.

However, despite obvious mineral extraction and relationship building between foreign companies and the states, an industry-wide pattern has appeared: mining data and statistics are incomplete, unbalanced, or completely absent. Gaps in disclosure allow conflicts and inequalities to fester, enabling powerful companies and governments to exploit both resources and miners. In the DRC, resource smuggling and fraudulent reporting financially benefit political elites, while 71% of Congolese citizens live in extreme poverty (The Sentry, n.d.). Zambia, while not as politically turbulent, likewise maintains years' worth of gaps in mining statistics ("Commodity Trade Statistics Database," 2017). Speculation about foreign interests affecting the transparency of mining operations—meaning business contracts, revenues, or changes in ownership—raises ethical concerns for investors and consumers. While Zambian and Congolese governments and mining companies see value in transparent reporting, strategic interests take precedence, dictating the type and amount of data publicly available.

In this paper, I explore foreign intervention regarding mining operations in Zambia and the DRC, analyzing whether the actions of international transparency initiatives correspond with Immanuel Wallerstein's theoretical idea of relationships between the developed world and its less developed counterparts. The study examines public information involving natural resource extraction and relationships of state governments, international investors, and nongovernmental organizations. Wallerstein's world-systems theory conceptualizes the economic rationale behind global involvement in regional mining operations and analyzes foreign intervention in evolving markets. In accordance with the theoretical framework, problems within the mining sector can be attributed to developmental power imbalances. I apply the theory to mines in Zambia and the DRC, two mineral-rich countries with different economic and political environments. The study analyzes mining regulation and public records to identify data gaps and incentivize participation in accountability initiatives. Involvement in transparency programs could improve the value of investments and accountability of the whole mining industry.

I argue foreign intervention in underdeveloped, mineral-rich countries is not purely exploitative by rule, which can be demonstrated through implementation of international transparency initiatives. At the onset, I present economic, social, and political effects of multinational mining investments. Next, I introduce world-systems theory, applying the concept of core-periphery relationships to foreign intervention and mineral extraction in Zambia and the DRC. The methods section underlines data collection of mining activities and analyzes transparency initiatives. Next, I integrate world-systems theory to suggest a non-exploitative relationship is possible. Lastly, I highlight the significance of international accountability programs within the mining industry and show the importance of state and public support to such initiatives.

Literature Review

Economic Effects of Extractive Investments

Within the scope of economics, governments entice foreign investors with tax incentives and regulatory reductions. Since the structural adjustment period of the 1980s, foreign investments have appealed to many African economies. Natural resource privatization grants more control to large international firms, therefore limiting state ability to monitor resource management and ownership trends. For example, following the emergence of neoliberal economic policies, foreign influence over the Zambian economy weakened national stability and bargaining power (Larmer, 2005). Global institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund encourage privatization as financial leverage (Lungu, 2008). The privatization of previously state-owned entities privileges outside investors over domestic interests. To capitalize on foreign investments and maintain economic stability, African states rely upon natural resource wealth. Public record of investments and contracts adds legitimacy to the industry and could justify continued negotiations between states and external actors.

As multinational corporations build investments with intentions of profitability and market expansion, they extract resources at the expense of weak national governments. Within strategic investment agreements, operating countries grant deductions and exemptions to companies who then routinely avoid paying corporate taxes, on grounds of maintaining investments for contracted periods of time (Lungu, 2008). As profitability comes first, MNCs will interfere in domestic issues or political conflicts to protect shareholder interests, even at the risk of damaging the operating country (Saleem, 2002). Large MNCs control power structures and mining securities, creating exploitative extractive systems. Consequentially, by not prioritizing long-term African resource security, multinational investments could jeopardize the stability of African economies. States can take significant steps towards mitigating companies' conflicts of interest by releasing clear public records of all mining transactions.

According to social scientists, the state's role as head of political and economic forces becomes complicated due to increased commercial relationships with foreign companies. Weakened political institutions coupled with a strong multinational presence do not create a stable view of people-centered sustainable development. The crippling economic effects of the resource curse can be linked to structural shortcomings in bureaucratic institutions (Idemudia, 2009). For example, overwhelmingly dependent on oil, Nigeria's economic history demonstrates the state is not equipped with the management capabilities necessary for efficient industry regulation and reform (Idemudia, 2009). African economies have become substantially dictated by outside interests rather than domestic needs, potentially weakening stability within national power structures. The complexity of resource relations requires a strong state presence against manipulative interference in order to maintain a legitimate sense of national sovereignty.

Additional Effects of Multinational Mining

As previously mentioned, the lack of transparent regulatory frameworks in the mining sector provokes recurrent resource exploitation and social inequalities. Multinational corporations and the state engage in strategic commercial negotiations to incentivize foreign investment, despite the risk of long-term economic degradation. Both parties can undertake responsibility to release clear, structured agreements, presenting the details of continued mining projects. Proposals like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) encourage governments and MNCs to voluntarily commit information about extractive involvement to boost business repute and political legitimacy (Le Billon, 2006). With international platforms, civil society groups can push law reform towards initiatives like EITI to better gauge government expenditures and accountability related to foreign intervention (Lungu, 2008). Corrupt mining agreements between state entities and multinational corporations run the risk of inciting ethnic conflict and militant activity, further incentivizing government reporting (Kemp, Owen, Gotzmann, & Bond, 2011). With the high concentration of mining activities in the Central African Copperbelt, a lack of transparency can potentially hurt the credibility of international companies and the state. Based on research into social responsibility standards, engagement in policy reforms could increase the industry's accountability and boost local standards of living. Such research could illuminate problems and subsequent solutions to improve mining and community sustainability.

Company-community relations create potential social change in the mining industry. With opposing cultural dynamics at play, multinational corporations and communities work through various social conflicts and differences. Facing financial and legal issues, local communities become more assertive with natural resource management. Advocates protest for labor rights and environmental conservation, but often run into strong corporate bureaucracy seeking to silence opposition (Talla, 2010). Company-community conflict heightens with management negligence and institutional repression of local protests, especially regarding indigenous lands (Kemp et al., 2011). Advocacy is a social tool with the potential to activate transparent regulatory structures within the mining sector. Research into such structural benefits could also support communities affected by foreign mining investments.

Corporate citizenship initiatives have become a trend within the sphere of economics, stemming from grassroots advocacy movements and collective action protests. Participating in constructive development work or engagement projects benefits MNCs, improving community relations and adding legitimacy to investments. For example, the Canadian government has prompted national mining companies to engage in efforts to broaden corporate accountability initiatives and improve human rights records in conflict zones (Le Billon, 2006). Other international mining companies have also presented frameworks for community feedback to increase local dialogue and resolve disputes (Kemp et al., 2011). Past corporate actions show potential for change within the extractive sector, but also emphasize structural imbalances. The desire for profit runs the risk of disincentivizing social responsibility and consequently continuing exploitation at the expense of local livelihoods.

World-Systems: A Critique of Inequality

Within the realm of social science, world-systems theory seeks to clarify social and economic power differentials between countries across developmental stages. Immanuel Wallerstein (2004) analyzes history and economic markets to highlight inequalities between strong and weak states. Based on the theory, the relationship of the "core" to the "periphery" can appear patronizing, as core states attempt to control the social and economic success of less-developed nations. The core, having been developed longer and more substantially, provides a model for the periphery to encourage growth, but also takes advantage of the periphery's lack of development by exhausting peripheral resources (Wallerstein, 2004). World-systems theory critiques exploitative power relations of the world, common in post-colonial African governments and markets (Babones, 2014). Peripheral states depend upon core states for support, linking peripheral economic and political success to more developed nations. World-systems theory explains exploitative trends in economic relationships between African nations and the West.

More developed states assert expertise, gleaned from years of political and economic shifts in the world-system, upon less-developed peripheral nations and can subsequently dictate usage of essential domestic elements, such as land, labor, and capital. Foreign economic involvement intensifies core-periphery disparities. Systemic inequalities can be deeply rooted in an oppressive colonial past. Western Europe colonized much of what is known as the "Third World," leaving behind a state of underdevelopment explaining current social turmoil (Chirot & Hall, 1982). Furthermore, international influence can obstruct development, as inputting foreign capital into a developing economy could cause potential market manipulation and a corrupt redistribution of wealth and power (Wellhofer, 1995). Multinational corporations play a leading role in exploitative relationships between the core and periphery, extracting peripheral resources and returning profits to the core. As world-systems theory maintains, the global market often supports the economic goals of multinational companies, gaining strength from powerful capitalist-centered nations. Holding MNCs accountable through transparent reporting could create a more equal economic exchange, thus lessening chances of social and political tensions in underdeveloped states.

According to world-systems theorists, the core strips the periphery of resources and establishes standards to protect self-interests. Stronger countries are thus able to dictate advantageous trade terms. On the other hand, weak states are unable to fight dominant powers and could lose important labor and capital. The core can assert exploitative power through labor and property regulation, subsequently damaging peripheral economic goals (Wallerstein, 2004). Poor economic growth in peripheral nations shows the disproportionate correlation between production and compensation in developing countries (Wellhofer, 1995). International mining companies invested in the Central African Copperbelt epitomize powerful core interests in peripheral environments.

Data and Methods

While researching, I analyzed mining projects and agreements between companies and states through official state and corporate archival documents. To find mining statistics, I accessed governmental databases from each country, such as the Zambia Chamber of Mines and the Ministère des Mines of the DRC. I also accessed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act from the United States National Archives, using Section 1504, which is focused on the transparency of multinational mineral extraction in Africa, including Zambia and the DRC. To complete the data, I accessed reports from reputable nongovernmental and inter-governmental organizations. I used the African Power Mining Projects archive, an initiative seeking to provide objective public disclosure of African mining projects. The files include critical extractive information about forty-seven mines in various regions of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. I also utilized World Bank studies on mining performance and production to gauge the success of development programs.

To analyze qualitative research, I employed thematic coding, producing data files from the literature. As many Congolese archival sources were only available in French, I created corresponding files in English to compare strategic clauses in Zambian and Congolese mining contracts. The patterns I found within the data illustrate the logic of using thematic coding as the primary analytical method. With quantitative data, I used summary statistics to narrow down the findings. To analyze statistics from the African Power Mining Projects database, I condensed organized information into a specific spreadsheet more relevant to the DRC and Zambia. While the previous report contained data for over four hundred mines, I restricted the spreadsheet to forty-seven mines for more succinct analysis. I then utilized maps of both countries to create a visual basis of mine concentration. With fewer mines to analyze, I can spot production patterns and differences between the mines in respect to geographic locations. Furthermore, using summary statistics for quantitative data, I can more specifically identify comparative trends between Zambia and the DRC.

Analysis

External interests threaten national mineral sovereignty, as foreign ownership dwarfs domestically owned mining companies in Zambia and the DRC. Of forty-seven prominent mines analyzed across both countries, multinational companies own and operate forty, with a majority, if not 100%, of the shares in each mine (World Bank Group, 2016). Mine privatization contributes to this trend, as foreign bidders take precedence during mining negotiations (Serlemitsos & Fusco, 2003). Thus, smaller, nationally-based companies are unable to compete for influence and ownership. By redistributing state power to capitalist-minded multinational players, privatization could increase the risks of domestic problems like unemployment and labor inequalities. In a Wallerstein world, MNCs represent influential international actors controlling potentially exploitative relationships between the corporate world and less powerful mines.

Mining companies investing in Zambia and the DRC, in conjunction with state governments, engage in established initiatives to increase transparent regulation and address economic discrepancies. However, these accountability initiatives have not been headed by national governments, but by outside institutions. For example, the United Nations General Assembly backed the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which uses state regulatory requirements to hold the diamond industry accountable regarding the influx of conflict diamonds into the legitimate trade (*The Role of Diamonds*, 2002). Mining negotiations between the Congolese diamond mining company, La Societé Minière de Bakwanga, and de Beers Centenary reference commitment to the certification system, adhering to the principles of an established regulatory framework such as the KCPS (*Protocole d'Accord*, 2005). Similarly, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, established in 2003 as the global transparency standard, incentivizes Zambian and Congolese governments to publicly release information about expenditures and relationships with mining companies (Rogan, 2016). Efforts toward established regulatory frameworks for transparency mostly originate outside the state. Thus, international transparency initiatives attempt to hold both Zambia and the DRC, along with multinational investors, accountable.

Critics could suggest states actively choose to disregard intervening pressure to implement government transparency programs, arguing that such decisions could threaten national interests. As multinational companies do not want to release data with potentially negative consequences, states might desire to take protectionist stances against external regulatory interference. For example, in conflict-ridden countries like the DRC, releasing certain information could incite tensions between ethnic factions (Kemp et al., 2011). Furthermore, foreign direct investment accounts for 1.7 billion dollars worth of the Congolese GDP, and ironically, the Zambian GDP as well (*General Profile: DRC,* 2015; *General Profile: Zambia*, 2015). Consequently, wealth and power from foreign investments could overshadow the states' commitment to ethical business practices. This tendency increases the importance of international pressure for transparency. To accommodate states' refusal to provide details on mining revenue and activity would confirm the exploitative core-periphery relationship world-systems theory proposes.

International transparency legislation challenges world-systems' consistent description of core-periphery interactions. A Wallerstein view expects transparency initiatives to pursue self-interests in reporting, yet, the programs act only to increase data accessibility of mining activities. In 2015, the Ministère des Mines of the DRC released 126 official contracts and documents through the ResourceContracts.org database, in adherence with EITI standards (Okenda, Pedersen, Toledano, & Young, 2017). The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment and Natural Resource Governance Institute began this initiative in 2015, supported by the World Bank and UK Department for International Development. The program aims to accommodate corporate, media, and governmental goals for due diligence in reporting (Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, n.d.). While focusing on transparency issues within the DRC, this international initiative and others do not seek to exploit the host countries Wallerstein would label "peripheral." The objectives of such programs are to educate and raise awareness of statistical mining discrepancies.

Skeptics of this interpretation could question the motives of inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) seeking to promote transparency of mining operations. The risk of an institution playing savior and claiming technological or infrastructural superiority to teach less developed countries like Zambia and the DRC would fit with Wallerstein's key theoretical components of core-based exploitation. Also, as MNCs act with self-interests in mind with mineral extraction and operational reports, a similar skepticism of NGOs' objectives for releasing information is valid. For example, as of 2017, over ninety global financial institutions actively support EITI's mining revenue disclosure platform, leading to potential postulations of the organization's monetary conflicts of interest (*Investors' Statement on Transparency*, 2015). Similarly, nongovernmental organizations often carry the burden of taking a top-down understanding of development situations in projects, consequentially becoming more of a hindrance than a help to underdeveloped countries (University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, n.d.). While recognizing the possibility of outliers, nongovernmental organizations involved in mining transparency prioritize ethical interests and logic to advocate for public disclosure. Tangible statistics and evidence of governmental and investor cooperation validate these programs.

International nongovernmental organizations challenge multinationals' selective release of mining data. NGO-initiated programs seek to hold MNCs accountable through regulation. As both actors are parts of the developed core, the battle between the two relieves pressure in core-periphery relationships, shifting tension to the core. Since the implementation of EITI standards in 2008, Zambian Mining Code has reintroduced corporate income tax and decreased royalty rates, creating a more equitable mining sector (Baxter et al., 2016). The EITI, a product of the Norway-based EITI Association, has goals to strengthen and keep governments accountable in the extractive sector (*Governance of the EITI*, n.d.). By challenging potentially exploitative foreign interests in Central African mining, international efforts for transparency illustrate commitment to addressing power imbalances. Wallerstein's theory maintains capitalist interests insure core dominance at the expense of developing economies, but these "core versus core" interactions between MNCs and NGOs introduce another non-exploitative relationship, beneficial to developing countries.

Even if transparency programs originate outside the realms of the state, the results can be encouraging to localized efforts for mining transparency. With multinational interests dictating policy and publicity, small-scale initiatives can push for transparency with international programs. For example, the US-based Carter Center has partnered with an independent research association, Moabi DRC, and collaborates with civil society groups, governments, and private organizations to accumulate over 800 mining reports (Congo Mines, 2017). In Zambia, the Publish What You Pay coalition, or PWYP (also active in the DRC), unites fourteen civil society organizations to supplement EITI records and initiate collective action against statistical discrepancies (Publish What You Pay, n.d.). The relationships between international organizations such as the Carter Center and PWYP show cooperative methods of dealing with deficient data. Working with small-scale projects to address accountability problems within the mining sector, NGOs can use advanced platforms to highlight industry issues.

Advocates for maintaining state credibility could argue against state responsibility for initiating national transparency proposals if other reputable legislation exists. Post-privatization, individual investors own many mines between Zambia and the DRC. Without state ownership, advocates raise a viable critique of national responsibility to regulate the industry with state resources. Since legislative changes in 1995, Zambia's Mining Code has limited governmental intervention to a regulatory rather than participatory role to coincide with the changes in state to private ownership (Ndulo, 2013). The Democratic Republic of Congo took a similar position in 2008, citing financial feasibility as justification for a more regulatory stance in the mining industry (Müller-Koné, 2015). Yet, while both countries have chosen indirect roles in the extractive sector, mining activities and revenue directly impact national governments and citizens. Thus, states are responsible for producing transparent data about national and corporate agreements. With this argument, state-initiated transparency efforts are just as necessary as externally initiated regulatory frameworks.

Governments and MNCs have undergone pressure for disclosure of mining records, enough to create requirements for mineral importation and extractive agreements. The push for transparency shows the value of public disclosure is not limited to local citizens. For American companies, before recognizing contract legitimacy, Section 1504 of the legislation commonly known as the Dodd-Frank Act lays out explicit requirements for complete disclosure of financial, time, and project logistics (*Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform*, 2010). Without these records, reporting discrepancies can permit potential economic damage. For example, the current Mining Code in the DRC allowed for losses of 1.36 billion U.S. dollars between 2010 and 2012, due to a lack of reporting between Canadian Banro Corporation and the Congolese president (Müller-Koné, 2015). Global pressure to release mining documents creates accountability with the potential to rectify financial losses. These disclosures paired with formal state regulation of mineral extraction would improve the nature and efficiency of mining investments.

As legislation like the Dodd-Frank Act suggests, regulatory efforts to publicize mining activity benefits investing multinational companies. Legally obligated to provide risk assessment for investors, MNCs must publish business transactions. To balance responsibility, Zambian and Congolese governments could argue the necessity for more corporate involvement in reporting, subsequently shifting some obligation to mining companies. For example, of the five companies invested in Zambia's nine largest mines, three, all based outside of Zambia, have published reports, showing inadequate domestic reporting ("African Mining Project Database," 2010). Also, based on a 2015 support statement to EITI, ninety-three international investing companies recognize the value of transparent reporting in the extractives sector (*Investors' Statement on Transparency,* 2015). Considering corporate legalities, companies should push for transparency. Declarations such as the aforementioned set corporate standards for other companies to strive towards. Collaborative efforts between MNCs and national governments to increase transparency could increase the scope and productivity of such programs.

Taking part in transparency initiatives such as EITI increases state credibility abroad, as mining companies hope for risk-averse environments for investors. Operating in fifty-two countries, EITI compliance offers a globally recognized transparency standard. The program has increased reporting on mining activities, with marked progress in participation. In the seven years since the DRC committed to EITI membership, the number of reporting companies in the extractive sector has increased 450%, with higher reported revenues (*Rapport annuel d'avancement*, 2015). EITI holds multinational corporations accountable by essentially peer-pressuring competitors into releasing mining statistics (*Frequently asked questions*, n.d.). Well-established transparency initiatives possess the leverage to keep MNCs accountable to investors and host countries. As emphasized by EITI's success, nongovernmental organizations can support peripheral nations by advocating for mining disclosures.

Discussion

Industrial Accountability

Multinational investment in the extractive industries in Zambia and the DRC instigates resource exploitation largely benefiting investment companies. MNCs originate from developed capitalist countries and are better equipped to infiltrate and manipulate resource-rich markets. With mine privatization, the state's regulatory role becomes convoluted, giving mining corporations more control. The movement of capital and resources from the periphery to the core characterizes Wallerstein's world-systems theory. Consistent with world-systems theory, shifting mineral wealth from peripheral economies to core-dominated markets leaves the economies of countries like Zambia and the DRC dependent upon investing companies. Without significant state regulation and surveillance, resource exploitation will continue.

The mining sector's privatized structure grants companies direct control of mining activities, but leaves regulatory responsibilities to the state. Amid highly concentrated foreign involvement in the industry, an orchestrated effort for operational transparency by Zambian and Congolese governments would build state accountability. Several significant programs promote public accessibility of mining data and have engineered support from both states, but they originate outside national borders and jurisdiction. Despite cooperating with initiatives like EITI, neither state shows intentions of creating a national push towards regulatory transparency programs. The lack of records and statistics available to interested consumers on archival and government websites introduces postulations of state passivity. With international critiques of the political policies and competencies of both countries, particularly the DRC, initiatives to fully disclose mining activities would increase credibility abroad and improve mining sustainability.

Advocacy for Regulatory Reforms

The national governments of Zambia and the DRC should proactively monitor extractive activity. While the state's role has become more regulatory, both nations have not instigated policies to keep MNCs in check. Independent researchers and NGOs recognize the potential for capitalist multinational influences upon mining legislation and resource extraction. The EITI incentivizes countries like Zambia and the DRC to annually release reports highlighting tax code and legal agreements to analyze mine ownership, but usually encounter barriers to full disclosure (*Rapport annuel d'avancement*, 2015). By researching mine ownership, an internationally prominent program like EITI requires states to scrutinize corporate mining practices. Nongovernmental publication of industry research and statistics should motivate state governments to investigate regulatory loopholes and potentially shady mining agreements.

Investors and consumers should hold MNCs accountable for operations in Zambia and the DRC, demanding publication of mining contracts and company decisions. With shareholder pressure, companies may see value in releasing mining reports. Thus, motivating civil society to pressure MNCs into releasing operational data would advance consistent standards for transparency. External interests drive corporate action and social policy in these countries more than domestic concerns (Amuwo, 2009). Similarly, while this research shows production trends from internationally-originated transparency initiatives, the programs tend to prioritize Western goals for accountability, even if inapplicable to African societies (Idemundia, 2009). A demand for MNC accountability ought to come from the shareholders the companies seek to impress. Transparent data accompanies smart investments, and MNCs should recognize the value of releasing all data to the public.

Regardless of profits from MNC investments, Zambia and the DRC should choose to prioritize publishing complete mining data. If this study's argument is valid and the release of information about mining activities constitutes a battleground between corporate interests and nongovernmental agendas, then states would develop mining policies to maintain advantage. Based on revenue and export statistics, Zambia and the DRC could appear shackled to multinational interests rather than domestic needs (World Bank Group, 2016). The nations also depend upon the aid and research of NGOs, but resource wealth and investor expectations motivate state agendas (Le Billon, 2006). Transparent reporting should become normative within the mining sectors to showcase national control despite foreign intervention. State credibility would increase, as would mine sustainability and development.

Conclusion

Foreign interests influence Zambian and Congolese economies, dictating mineral extraction through mine ownership and attempting to control publication of mining data. However, international interests do not necessarily have to be exploitative, as Immanuel Wallerstein's theory suggests. The transferal of power and mine ownership from the state to multinational companies permits resource exploitation, and NGOs and IGOs informally regulate the industry, setting reporting standards. By establishing transparency initiatives to make mining figures publicly accessible, external actors seek to benefit the industry, workers, and host countries through clear reporting. Investors and consumers in the developed world also benefit from comprehensive data and can advocate to hold MNCs and governments accountable. The mining industry in Zambia and the DRC, while struggling to maintain economic, social, and political credibility, can address industrial issues with efforts to increase transparent reporting across the sector.

Similarly, if the Zambian and Congolese governments recognize correlations between community development and mining transparency, state support for clear reporting could increase and benefit the industry for the future. With collaborations for research and development between NGOs, state governments, and MNCs, mining in the Central African Copperbelt could improve, from the bottom-up. Then, as shoppers worldwide peruse aisles lined with glittering gadgets, they could have confidence in the integrity of the products, stemming from transparent, accessible information about sourcing and production. With this result, even Wallerstein could add an exception to his rules.

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